Impersonation Fraud

A growing trend involves synthetic identity fraud where perpetrators combine real information (like a Social Security number) with fake information (like a name and date of birth) to create a new credit profile. Prosecutors treat this as bank fraud.

We defend these cases by analyzing the credit application process. If the financial institution failed to verify the applicant's identity due to their own negligence, we argue that the fraud was facilitated by the bank's lack of due diligence rather than our client's criminal ingenuity. We also challenge the link between the defendant and the synthetic profile by questioning IP address attribution.

Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1028A, using a real person's identity during a felony carries a mandatory two-year prison sentence that runs consecutively to any other sentence. This is the prosecutor's hammer.

However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the government must prove the defendant knew the identity belonged to a real person. In cases involving bulk data or dark web purchases, we argue that the defendant believed they were using fake or generated numbers. If the government cannot prove actual knowledge of a real victim, the mandatory two-year enhancement must be dismissed.

Possessing or using counterfeit access devices (such as cloned SIM cards or faked login credentials) is a separate federal crime. This is often the charge used against those who provide the technical infrastructure for fake identity scams.

We scrutinize the search warrants used to seize these devices. If law enforcement overstepped their authority in searching digital devices or cloud accounts, we file motions to suppress the evidence. Without the device, the government often cannot prove possession or intent.

The initial act of taking over a messenger account violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Prosecutors charge defendants with accessing a protected computer without authorization.

We defend against these charges by examining the method of access. If the defendant was given the password or if the access was part of a shared account arrangement, the authorization defense applies. We also challenge the jurisdictional reach of the CFAA in cases where the server access occurred outside the United States.

Most messenger scams involve a script where the imposter claims to be in an emergency (such as being arrested or hospitalized) and demands immediate payment. This is a classic theft by deception.

Our defense strategy focuses on the mens rea. If our client allowed their bank account to be used to receive these funds because they were promised a commission for a legitimate service, they lack the intent to defraud. We present evidence of the client's communications with the masterminds to show that they were deceived regarding the source of the funds.

Messenger apps often operate across state and international lines making venue a contestable issue. Federal prosecutors must bring the case in the district where the crime occurred.

We analyze the server logs and the location of the victims. If the connection to the charging district is tenuous, we move to dismiss for improper venue. This legal maneuvering can force the government to drop charges or refile in a jurisdiction more favorable to the defense.

Smishing often involves the use of autodialers or SIM farms to blast out messages claiming to be from banks or delivery services. Prosecutors charge the operators of this equipment with conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

We challenge the forensic evidence linking our client to the broadcasts. We argue that the client's phone number was spoofed by a third party. Spoofing technology allows criminals to make texts appear to come from legitimate numbers. We use telecommunications experts to trace the true origin of the messages and exonerate our client.

A common tactic involves sending a text alerting the victim to a fake suspicious transaction and asking them to reply, effectively handing over their login credentials. This leads to bank fraud charges.

We focus on the lack of direct interaction. Unlike in-person fraud, the defendant never meets the victim. We argue that our client provided a technological service (such as hosting a website or selling data) without knowing it would be used for bank fraud. We emphasize the dual-use nature of technology to raise reasonable doubt about criminal intent.

SIM swapping is a technique where the fraudster convinces a mobile carrier to switch a victim's phone number to a new SIM card under their control. This allows them to intercept two-factor authentication codes via SMS.

This is a high-tech crime that carries severe penalties. Our defense involves scrutinizing the interaction with the carrier. Often, the carrier's negligence in following security protocols is a contributing factor. We also investigate whether our client was merely a purchaser of the swapped number on the secondary market rather than the person who performed the swap (reducing their culpability).

To convict, the government must prove a cohesive scheme to defraud. We argue that isolated acts or misunderstandings do not constitute a scheme.

In messenger scam cases, we argue that the defendant's actions were sporadic and lacked the organized structure required for a conspiracy conviction. We deconstruct the government's timeline to show gaps and inconsistencies that suggest a lack of coordination.

The deception must be material meaning it would influence a reasonable person's decision. We challenge the materiality of the statements made in SMS scams.

If the text message was obviously spam or if the victim did not rely on the content of the message when sending money, the fraud charge may fail. We scrutinize the victim's testimony to determine exactly why they transferred the funds. If they acted out of negligence or for reasons unrelated to the impersonation, we argue for acquittal.

Most impersonation cases are charged as conspiracies. This allows the government to hold a low-level participant responsible for the actions of the entire group.

We fight to sever our client's case from the co-defendants. We argue that our client had a limited role and did not agree to the broader criminal objectives. We use the buyer-seller defense to argue that a simple transaction (like selling a SIM card) does not make one a member of the criminal conspiracy.

Many clients charged in these cases are money mules who were tricked into moving funds. They believed they were working for a legitimate company or helping a friend.

We present evidence of the grooming process. We show the emails and messages where the client was lied to by the real scammers. We argue that the client was a victim of the same impersonation fraud they are accused of committing. Proving a lack of criminal intent is the most powerful defense in these cases.

The government often relies on IP addresses to identify the defendant. We challenge the reliability of this attribution.

We investigate whether the client's Wi-Fi was unsecured or if their device was part of a botnet. Malware can allow hackers to route traffic through an innocent person's computer. We use forensic analysis to show that the fraudulent activity originated from an external source effectively using our client's device as a proxy.

We vigorously challenge the search warrants used to seize phones and computers. If the warrant was overly broad or lacked probable cause, we move to suppress all evidence obtained from the device.

We also challenge the chain of custody of digital evidence. If the government cannot prove that the data on the hard drive has not been altered since seizure, it is inadmissible. We hold the government to the highest standards of digital forensics.