Bicycle Accident in Washington D.C. | Hit and Run Defense Resulting in a Suspended Sentence

The client was driving late at night along a District roadway where the posted speed limit was significantly lower than the speed he was actually traveling. 

While passing through an area shared by vehicles and bicyclists, he struck a cyclist who was lawfully using the roadway, causing the rider to fall and sustain bodily injury.

Shocked and panicked by the bicycle accident and the sudden appearance of bystanders, the driver briefly slowed but did not immediately stop to render aid or provide identifying information. 

Instead, he left the scene, later admitting that his decision was driven by fear rather than a clear understanding of his legal obligations.

When law enforcement traced the vehicle through traffic camera footage and witness descriptions, the driver quickly retained counsel to address the hit and run and related traffic offenses.

From the outset, the client’s exposure under D.C. law was substantial because the collision had caused bodily injury to another person. 

Under D.C. Code § 50-2201.05c(a)(1), any driver who knows or has reason to believe that their vehicle has been in a collision resulting in injury must immediately stop, remain on the scene until law enforcement arrives, and provide identifying information to both law enforcement and the injured person. 

Leaving without doing so is a criminal offense that can result in up to 180 days of incarceration for a first conviction when injury is involved, and more if there is a prior conviction.

Because the client had been speeding, the government also evaluated charges under D.C. Code § 50-2201.04, which defines reckless and aggravated reckless driving where a driver exceeds the speed limit by 20 miles per hour or more and causes bodily injury or substantial property damage. 

Together, these statutes meant that the bicycle accident in Washington D.C. could realistically lead to a term of confinement unless significant mitigation was shown.

D.C. Code § 50-2201.05c requires a driver who knows or has reason to believe that a collision has occurred to stop immediately and fulfill specific duties depending on the circumstances. 

Where another person is injured, subsection (a)(1) mandates that the driver call or cause another to call 911 or emergency assistance if necessary, remain on the scene until law enforcement arrives, and provide identifying information both to law enforcement and the injured party. 

The statute also makes clear in subsection (c) that it is not a defense that the driver was intoxicated, distracted, or not at fault for the collision, which is especially important in the context of a bicycle accident where fault may later be disputed. 

While subsection (b) recognizes an affirmative defense if a driver reasonably leaves the scene due to personal safety concerns and promptly contacts 911 with identifying information and details of the crash, the facts in this case did not support that defense because the client simply drove away in fear without immediate contact with authorities.

The speeding component of the case required careful review of D.C. Code § 50-2201.04. Under subsection (b), a person commits reckless driving by driving 20 miles per hour or more over the speed limit, or in any other manner that shows a conscious disregard for the risk of causing property damage or bodily injury. 

Subsection (c) goes further, defining aggravated reckless driving where the driver travels 30 miles per hour or more above the speed limit, or at least 20 miles per hour above the limit and causes bodily injury, collides with another motor vehicle, or causes $1,000 or more in property damage. 

Penalties include up to 90 days of incarceration for reckless driving and up to 180 days for aggravated reckless driving on a first or second conviction, with higher exposure for repeat offenders. 

Because the injured party in this bicycle accident suffered bodily injury and the client admitted to speeding significantly above the posted limit, the government viewed aggravated reckless driving as a viable charge, compounding the seriousness of the leaving after colliding count.

One of the most significant factors in this case was the client’s prompt acceptance of responsibility once law enforcement made contact. 

Instead of denying involvement in the bicycle accident, he cooperated fully, admitted that he had been speeding, and acknowledged that he had left the scene in panic. 

Counsel emphasized to the prosecutor and the court that the client waived any attempt to minimize his role and agreed to plead guilty to charges including leaving after colliding under § 50-2201.05c(a)(1). 

This early cooperation allowed the defense to argue that a suspended sentence would still serve the rehabilitative and deterrent purposes of the law, because the client was already engaging with the legal process in a constructive way.

Beyond cooperation, the defense made concrete efforts to address the harm caused by the bicycle accident. 

The client arranged for restitution to the injured cyclist, covering medical expenses and related losses to the extent possible, and he expressed sincere remorse directly through a written statement and, when appropriate, in court. 

Counsel also documented that the client was the primary income earner for his household and that a lengthy period of incarceration would jeopardize the stability of his family and dependents. 

Based on these factors, the defense proposed a sentencing structure that included a suspended sentence, supervised probation, continued employment, and compliance with any additional conditions such as traffic safety courses and community service focused on road safety and awareness of bicyclists.

At sentencing, the court recognized that the offenses leaving after colliding under § 50-2201.05c(a)(1) and speeding conduct that met the definition of reckless driving under § 50-2201.04 were serious and could justify a period of confinement. 

However, the judge balanced this against the client’s lack of prior criminal history, full cooperation, prompt restitution to the injured cyclist, and the documented impact that incarceration would have on his family. 

The court imposed a jail term within the statutory range but suspended its execution, placing the client on supervised probation with conditions that required continued employment, completion of a traffic safety and defensive driving program, and ongoing compliance with all D.C. traffic laws. 

The result allowed the client to avoid immediate imprisonment while keeping a suspended sentence in place as a powerful incentive to avoid any future violation.

This case underscores several practical lessons for any driver involved in a bicycle accident in Washington D.C. First, drivers must understand that leaving the scene of a collision, especially where someone is injured, is itself a crime under § 50-2201.05c, regardless of who was at fault for the initial impact. 

Second, excessive speed that leads to bodily injury can elevate a case into reckless or aggravated reckless driving under § 50-2201.04, significantly increasing potential penalties. 

Finally, if a mistake has already been made, immediate consultation with counsel, cooperation with law enforcement, restitution to the injured person, and a well documented mitigation plan can make the difference between a custodial sentence and a suspended sentence that allows the defendant to remain in the community under strict supervision.